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[View as PDF] In Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law,[1] Lisa Bressman pulls together two disparate traditions in contemporary administrative law scholarship: one that stems from the work of generations of leading legal scholars and the other that emerges, more recently, from leading work in positive political theory (PPT) in political science. Professor Bressman explains why and how theories of judicial control of regulatory administration must take account of both how agencies function and the political environment in which administrative decisionmaking occurs. After all, administrative law shapes administrative politics in profound ways. Congress configures administrative procedures in the shadow of legal doctrines; moreover, courts are themselves deep in the business of procedure-configuring, as modern American administrative law amply demonstrates.

Professor Garrett’s impressive empirical analysis of the first 200 postconviction DNA exonerations in the United States (“Garrett Study”) has the potential to affect contemporary debates surrounding our nation’s criminal justice system. This Response explores this potential by harnessing the Study’s data in support of arguments for and against a contested doctrinal proposition—that guilt-based harmless error rules should never apply in death penalty appeals.

In Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, I aim to connect the insights of legal scholars and positive political theory (PPT) scholars about the purpose of administrative procedures. For some time now, legal scholars and PPT scholars have maintained parallel but largely independent discussions of this subject. According to legal scholars, administrative procedures serve due process or rule-of-law values and often run at odds with political values, including accountability and efficiency. Because administrative law has vacillated over time between procedures and politics, it seems to contain significant tensions. For example, agencies must confront the prospect of judicial scrutiny but are due judicial deference for their decisions. Agencies must choose procedures that command the force of law, but have a choice among procedures. Agencies must answer for their failures to enforce the law but may choose whether to enforce the law. Within this framework, legal scholars have divided themselves into two camps: those who favor procedure, and those who favor politics.